

# The Changing National Training Center

**Brigadier General Robert W. Cone, U.S. Army**

**S**INCE THE FIRST Army battalions rolled through Fort Irwin in California's high Mojave Desert in October 1981, the National Training Center (NTC) has helped lead a revolution in training that fundamentally transformed our Army's culture toward greater emphasis on warfighting proficiency in tactical units. Many credit the competencies fostered at the NTC for having played a key role in our Army's success in Operation Desert Shield/Storm as well as in the initial phases of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF).

While the NTC was a driving force in the Army's first revolution in training, the demands of the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) have required a fundamental reassessment of the character and nature of training at the NTC. Candid assessments by leaders involved in subsequent phases of OIF have suggested the combat training centers (CTCs) could gain a greater operational payoff by focusing training on the changing skill sets needed for ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.

## Change at the NTC

During the last 30 months, the NTC has experienced a period of profound and almost continuous change. While the specifics of change vary from rotation to rotation, the larger trend is toward refining the training experience based on feedback from the operational force. Changes at the NTC have focused on a number of key features associated with the GWOT and its campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan. Replication of the current operational environment has created an intellectual framework that allows leaders to exercise potential solutions to current problem sets, to build teams, and to gain experience in an environment with human terrain similar to what they will experience in theater. This entire process has created an environment in which leader development is energized.

The change in NTC training is manifested in the following important ways:

- Training at the NTC now places more emphasis on full-spectrum combat operations, especially counterinsurgency (COIN) training involving both kinetic and nonkinetic means. Cultural awareness training is a central feature of all phases of the rotation.
- While the NTC is ideally suited to prepare units for combat in a desert environment, increased emphasis on operations in urban and complex terrain has been essential in preparing units for combat in the GWOT.
- The NTC is doing more than ever before to help units integrate new technologies into their operations before they deploy to combat. The NTC

*Brigadier General Robert W. Cone, U.S. Army, has commanded the National Training Center, Fort Irwin, California, since September, 2004. He received a B.S. from the United States Military Academy, an M.A. from the University of Texas at Austin, and an M.A. from the Naval War College. He led the initial joint lessons learned effort in OIF and later formed the Joint Center for Operational Analysis and Lessons Learned at U.S. Joint Forces Command. He has served in the 2d Armored Division, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment, and 4th Infantry Division.*

is now playing a leading role in using technological innovations to train units to defeat insurgent use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs).

- With the growing significance of small-unit actions, the NTC has redoubled efforts to increase the rigor and fidelity of training at the small-unit level.

- Finally, the NTC is placing significantly greater emphasis on the use of joint enablers made available to tactical echelons involved in combat missions with operational and strategic consequences.

## Pillars of NTC Training

The key elements of the NTC experience have not changed. But, the challenge for NTC leaders has been to increase focus on the key aspects of the new operational environment while transitioning and maintaining the best of the traditional NTC culture, specifically—

- Customer-focused training. Unit self-assessment remains a vital element of training doctrine. As senior trainers, division commanders continue to establish unit training objectives and approve scenario design. No two NTC rotations are alike because no two units have identical training needs.

- Stressing units to their organizational limits. Units learn best when pushed to the threshold of failure. The NTC continues to push units to their limits, continuously raising the threat, modifying conditions, and maintaining standards of performance to expose weaknesses in key systems and functions. While the systems we stress today are different from those of the past, the pressure a unit feels must be both real and challenging. The NTC should be hard—in many ways more difficult than actual combat.

- Unblinking feedback. The NTC prides itself on providing brutally honest and irrefutable feedback on unit performance while providing a forum that encourages candid discussion and self-analysis by the unit. While the metrics of performance might have changed, the need for commanders to understand the strengths and weaknesses of their formations has not.

- Mastery of fundamentals. The NTC experience



Involving 1,600 role players, 250 of whom are Iraqi-Americans, NTC's village populations provide realism and social complexity consistent with the streets of Iraq or Afghanistan.

has always focused on developing proficiency in a core set of mission-essential tasks. While the tasks associated with the GWOT have changed to include proficiency in both kinetic and nonkinetic realms, the philosophy of focused training to achieve mastery remains the same.

- Collective task integration. The NTC focuses significant energy and resources on fully integrating all collective training tasks within a brigade combat team (BCT). The desired end-state is a holistic and synergistic approach to full-spectrum combat operations.

- Importance of home-station training. The level of training proficiency a unit achieves by the end of an NTC rotation directly relates to its entry training level. Experience shows that units that benefit most from the NTC arrive with solid small-unit and staff proficiency derived from home-station training. Units can then put their energies into taking full advantage of the higher level complexity and scale of problem sets the NTC environment provides.

- Unique training capabilities. Units do not come to the NTC to do what they are capable of doing at home station. The NTC's advantages in training high-intensity warfare over vast desert maneuver space and in challenging live-fire corridors can now be translated to Iraq-like distances with multiple towns, villages, caves, and urban live-fire venues. The NTC is one of only a few established training venues in the world that allow a BCT to operate at doctrinal distances in an instrumented live-fire and force-on-force environment.

## Integrating Lessons Learned

Another major feature of change at the NTC is our current focus on integrating lessons learned and best practices from theater into training scenarios. Leaders of the typical unit preparing for deployment and about to train at the NTC are aware of emerging problem sets from the theater that will pose challenges for their units. They do not seek our interpretation of doctrinal solutions to their problems. Rather, they ask us to teach them the best practices being used in theater to address particular problem sets. In most cases, existing doctrine provides a good point of departure for unit training. However, in a war in which the adversary is noted for being fiendishly reactive, units must seek to perform specific practices more precisely to advance quickly to the latest established iteration of successful performance.

To remain relevant, the NTC has established a dynamic process to capture lessons learned and best practices from the theater. The NTC uses three major processes to stay current on operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. These processes allow us to

triangulate observations about emerging trends in theater and thus develop greater confidence in the solutions we advocate to the problem sets we train units on.

First, the NTC monitors a number of classified and unclassified websites to identify emerging trends. The Center for Army Lessons Learned, U.S. Central Command, Multinational Force-Iraq, Multinational Corps-Iraq, and Multinational Security Transition Command-Iraq, as well as unit websites, provide valuable information about emerging tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) and evolving enemy trends. We also encourage units that have trained at the NTC to provide continuous feedback via the Internet on their experiences. We ask them to offer suggestions to modify training.

Second, the NTC sends observer/controllers (O/Cs) into theater to capture emerging trends and to conduct detailed studies of best practices and new problem sets. While passive collection from Internet sites provides good background information, it is necessary to actively examine unit performance in a combat



An O/C briefs members of an exercising unit prior to an NTC mission. Eighty percent of NTC O/C's have seen combat in Iraq or Afghanistan.

environment before advocating use of a particular practice to a training unit. Active observation allows O/Cs to understand the context surrounding the successful application of new TTPs. Trained units sponsor visits by O/Cs, and that established relationship often leads to greater rapport and continuity in the training process.

Third, while some of our best teachers and coaches do not have recent combat experience, we actively seek combat veterans with OIF or Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) experience to serve as O/Cs. Units appear to prefer O/Cs who can speak firsthand of their experiences in similar situations in combat. Over 80 percent of current field O/Cs have recent OIF/OEF experience, and that number will only increase with future assignment cycles.

## Physical Changes to the NTC Environment

Adapting the NTC to conduct training predicated on Iraq and Afghanistan has resulted in a substantial investment in physical infrastructure. These and future changes are absolutely essential to providing the necessary context and realism for the kinetic and nonkinetic COIN fight. New features at NTC include—

- **Towns and villages.** The NTC has constructed 13 towns and villages spread across 1,100 square miles in both live-fire and force-on-force environments. Buildings currently consist mainly of modified shipping containers, railroad cars, and storage sheds, but we are in the process of acquiring more permanent structures.

- **Caves and tunnels.** Using highway construction materials, the NTC has constructed 7 cave complexes in the mountainous regions of Fort Irwin. The NTC's largest town has an extensive underground tunnel complex that replicates a sewer system.

- **Mountain strongholds.** In hilly, constricted terrain, we have created a defensive complex known as Milawa Valley to provide a simulated terrorist training camp that serves as an objective for deliberate dismounted attack.

- **Forward operating bases.** Five semipermanent forward operating bases exist with adequate fest tents, life support, and force-protection facilities for a BCT.

- **Instrumentation.** The NTC has augmented its instrumentation system with fixed video facilities in its largest town. This system consists of 79 infrared and low-light cameras, a dual-editing and control suite, and a 40-seat theater facility. In addition, the NTC has experimented with instrumentation in cave complexes, using infrared video and mobile theaters. We are also currently experimenting with handheld broadband video capabilities.

- **Digital command and control facilities.** The NTC's division tactical operations center is fully equipped with a suite of Army battle command systems, including Command Post of the Future. This minimizes the division headquarters' requirement to provide a command and control (C2) node to support rotational training.

## Training in a Full-Spectrum Environment

The NTC offers rotating units an extensive menu of training options from the full spectrum of war. Units are usually within 1 to 6 months of deployment to Iraq or Afghanistan and seek mission-rehearsal exercises that meet predeployment training requirements. We meet that need. We also maintain the capability to provide a menu of predeployment lane training and limited new-equipment training on IED-defeat systems. At unit request, we have also conducted several rotations that included high-intensity combat operations against an armored threat in conjunction with a transition to mission-rehearsal exercise. NTC will maintain both the capability and institutional memory needed to offer this option to training units. Overall, the variety of training options that rotating units need has driven the NTC to develop new flexibility in training format, facilities, and rotation duration.

One of the greatest challenges we have faced in the last 2 years is developing adequate realism and robustness in training environments to support the problem sets we are encountering in Iraq and Afghanistan. These problem sets range from kinetic to nonkinetic; they call for human interaction and force units to consider all the elements of national power. Of course, the specific objective of our focused, replicative training is to facilitate a unit's rapid and successful transition into theater operations. Because many training units have done multiple combat deployments, there is an increasing





**Mission-rehearsal exercises replicate insurgent operations and allow units to hone essential skills such as traffic control point procedures and gathering human intelligence.**

requirement for realistic, sophisticated training to adequately challenge veteran units. Based on feedback from the operational force, what follows are examples of the kinds of tough problem sets emphasized during current mission-rehearsal exercises.

**Nonkinetic operations.** Training units in nonkinetic operations requires establishing an environment in which human terrain predominates. In such an environment, units can employ nonkinetic resources such as civil affairs (CA) and psychological operations (PSYOP) teams and public affairs officers; and they can conduct leader engagements, disburse money, and participate in reconstruction. To provide the human terrain necessary to train nonkinetic operations, the NTC populates its towns and villages with up to 1,600 role players, of which 250 are Iraqi-Americans who remain in their roles and live in the field for the entire 14-day training event. Each role player is influenced by respective tribal and religious leaders and maintains familial, social, and business relationships throughout the rotation. Some role players have businesses and jobs; others are unemployed and disenfranchised, ripe for insurgent recruitment. Each urban area has its own government structure, police force, businesses, criminal element, and ethnic tension. Provincial government and police forces also exert influence on towns and villages.

The human terrain element makes leaders and Soldiers engage with real Iraqis, a function that requires them to adapt to Iraqi culture and seek cooperation. Leaders conduct engagements and negotiate with provincial, town, and tribal leaders to gather information on insurgent activity and to find out who can create jobs, provide medical aid, or develop reconstruction projects. The human element also allows the training unit to employ CA and PSYOP teams throughout its area of operations to influence the role players. Iraqi role players' attitudes change based on unit actions.

The recently constructed Joint Coordination Center, modeled after facilities in theater, is the focal point of nonkinetic operations. It serves as a coordination center for those acting

as Coalition forces; Iraqi Security Forces; local government, tribal and religious leaders; local security and medical personnel; and nongovernmental organization (NGO) workers.

**Media operations.** The NTC also replicates television and print media continuously during the rotation. Television media are portrayed by mock versions of an Al Jazeera affiliate and an English-language network (the International News Network [INN]). While INN uses a Western reporting style, NTC's Al Jazeera is staffed by Iraqi-Americans who constantly report on a unit's actions and how those actions are perceived in the Arab world. Both networks are seemingly ubiquitous in the training unit's area of operations. They provide training for the unit's public affairs team and give unit leaders experience in interacting with reporters. Units learn how to recognize and even anticipate insurgent propaganda, and they work with available media sources to counter misinformation and rumor. Print media also comes into play: An Arabic newsletter is distributed throughout the entire town, detailing actions occurring during unit mission-rehearsal exercises.

**Fiscal operations.** Units practice using money from the full variety of in-theater sources, including the Commander's Emergency Response Program, to fund reconstruction operations, condolence payments, rewards, and claims. O/Cs track the

amount and purpose of money spent and ensure that the unit is properly accounting for its expenditures.

NTC towns and villages provide a venue to prepare for real-world reconstruction projects. Units use their internal engineers, CA teams, or attached forward engineer support teams to assess town infrastructure and determine where the unit needs to conduct reconstruction. After these assessments, units can contract for reconstruction using funds or internal assets to improve the town infrastructure. They can also employ Iraqi role players

to work on reconstruction projects (the idea being to help reduce the insurgent recruiting base).

**Intelligence-driven operations.** Like nonkinetic operations, intelligence-driven operations at the NTC require a richly textured training environment. Quality role playing is key. NTC has developed some 1,600 complex roles detailing the lives and motivations of role players; their familial, tribal, and religious influences; and their social and business relationships. Cultural role playing has become more authentic. To fully exercise a training unit's human intelligence and interrogation systems, Iraqi linguists now play leading roles.

Working with the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, the NTC has developed a software program called Reactive Information Propagation Planning for Lifelike Exercises (RIPPLE) to improve scenario realism and increase the quantity and fidelity of intelligence on the battlefield. RIPPLE is network-modeling and artificial-intelligence software that tracks all role players, roles, and relationships among the 1,600 Iraqi role players. It maps all social, familial, and business relationships in the scenario as well as each role player's personal history and motivation. Based on this mapping, the NTC can dynamically assess and model the effects of unit interaction with Iraqi role players. For example, if the unit positively or negatively affects a local Iraqi leader, RIPPLE can quickly determine second- and third-order effects of the actions and



Iraqi-American role players challenge U.S. forces on patrol. Soldiers benefit greatly from the realistic "human terrain" offered in each of the NTC's 13 towns.

issue instructions to role players accordingly. The software allows exercise designers to pick the right role player to take the right action to create credible cause-and-effect relationships.

The NTC has also worked closely with the University of Southern California's Institute for Creative Technology (ICT), a team of Hollywood producers, directors, actors, and special-effects technicians, to improve the quality of role play and the realism of scenarios. ICT has advised the NTC on script and scenario development, role player acting, the physical realism of towns and villages, and special effects to simulate IEDs.

For every terrorist action that occurs on the NTC battlefield, we must construct a credible and possibly detectable causal chain of events. This "kill chain," which replicates the events necessary for carrying out an insurgent act, derives from the latest available intelligence from theater. The NTC insurgency will generate over 120 terrorist acts in a 14-day period, each with its own kill chain and associated trail of intelligence clues.

Each rotation features over 300 threads of information with more than a thousand discrete pieces of intelligence woven throughout the training scenario. A role player holding potential clues could be the operator of an air conditioning repair shop, a member of the town council, or an actual insurgent. Good units will use the full range of assets to collect available information on the battlefield.

Detailed replication of insurgent activity and the use of intelligence threads drastically change the nature of the opposing force's (OPFOR's) mission requirements. OPFOR commanders responsible for realistic execution of all of these intelligence threads must maintain a balance between free play and scripted events, must establish proper atmospherics among the townspeople, and must maintain cultural realism continuously for 14 days.

Once the unit has collected intelligence, it must connect the dots. This challenging analytical process translates hundreds of pieces of raw data into knowledge that can aid the decisionmaker. Creating a high-fidelity environment to exercise intelligence analysis has been a major focus of the NTC. O/Cs are trained and site-licensed to help units use the latest software available from theater.

**Kinetic operations.** Once the primary focus of NTC training, kinetic operations are now trained in a theater-appropriate context. Some units request high-intensity conflict scenarios for their rotations, chiefly to train and maintain higher order combat skills within their units. Most kinetic operations are designed to exercise the skills that are most likely to be needed in theater: cordon and search, raids on high value targets, operations with Special Operations Forces (SOF), combat patrolling, and convoy security. The NTC uses a combination of out-of-sector operations in force-on-force and live-fire environments to stress a unit's ability to fire and maneuver.

**Detainee operations.** The NTC training environment provides a superb opportunity to establish a high moral standard in the treatment of detainees. Training units normally detain over 100 suspected insurgent role players during their mission-rehearsal exercise. NTC trains detainee operations using the latest published standards from theater. Units are required to fill out all the proper paperwork on detainees and to operate their own detainee collection point, which is inspected many times during the rotation by International Committee of the Red Cross role players.

**Evidence collection and exploitation.** The forcing function for realistic evidence collection and exploitation training is NTC's mock Central Criminal Court of Iraq. Just as they do in Iraq, units must bring detainees before an Iraqi judge. During court proceedings, Soldiers testify and the training unit's

staff judge advocate presents evidence for holding the detainee. Not every Soldier in the unit gets an opportunity to testify in the mock Iraqi court, but the unit can fully exercise its legal system during the rotation. Training units are provided instruction on best practices in evidence collection and exploitation from the most successful units in theater.

**IED defeat.** In partnership with the Joint IED Defeat Organization, the NTC has recently become the home of the Joint IED Defeat Center of Excellence. This resource gives NTC's training audience access to the latest IED-defeat technologies and mission-specific training on IED-defeat tasks. Because the NTC operating environment replicates the entire IED kill chain, NTC can train a comprehensive approach to IED defeat that targets actions against every node in the IED system.

The NTC conducts individual and small-unit IED-defeat training using IED indicators and reconnaissance lanes and by incorporating IED battle drills into mounted and dismounted combat patrols. While this training is important, the NTC, as a collective-task integrator, focuses training on battalion- and brigade-level responsibilities in integrating all IED-defeat capabilities available in the brigade's battlespace. Of particular note, we have found that when units take an offensive approach to COIN, intelligence-driven operations are especially important.

The NTC now maintains access to a fleet of the latest IED-defeat capabilities for units to draw from and train on during the rotation. The Center's vehicle set includes capabilities currently available in theater. Units also have access to some emerging technologies.

**Personnel recovery (PR).** Given recent emphasis on the important area of personnel recovery, the NTC provides a highly realistic venue for units to exercise PR operations both with and without the assistance of SOF. We currently offer three training scenarios in this area: downed Coalition pilots, captured U.S. Soldiers (including mission transition teams), and captured civilian contractors and aid workers. NTC trains in accordance with FM 3-50.1, *Army Personnel Recovery*, and provides O/Cs and scenario writers whom the Joint Personnel Recovery Agency has certified to train and help units in all phases of PR preparation and mission execution.

**Joint integration.** The GWOT compresses the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war. A



low-level tactical patrol somewhere in Al Anbar province could quickly achieve operational and strategic significance if it were to uncover intelligence that key Al-Qaeda operatives were nearby. Based on time available, this same tactical unit might almost immediately be given access to joint capabilities that were once the province of operational commanders. Today's young leaders are fully up to the challenge of applying these joint resources, and the NTC is working to create a training environment where all of the joint problem sets and enablers found in theater are routinely available for training.

The NTC has completed the U.S. Joint Forces Command accreditation process and has been recommended for conditional accreditation in the following eight tasks related to the GWOT:

- Counter-IED operations.
- Joint urban operations.
- Development and sharing of intelligence.
- Communications.
- Joint personnel recovery.
- Tactical information operations.
- Close air support.
- Joint fires.

NTC has twice served as a venue for Joint National Training Capability events, most recently in September 2005, when the Center hosted a rotation that focused on applying joint capabilities to key problem sets in COIN warfare such as—

- Precision fires in urban areas and against fleeting targets.
- Army Airspace Command and Control (A2C2).
- Integration of joint nonkinetic enablers.
- Integration of joint assets for IED defeat.
- Integration of joint assets to conduct PR operations.

Typical live joint enablers available at NTC during recent rotations included F-16s, C-17s, AC-130s, and a P-3 Orion with the Airborne Integrated Mapping System and associated Rover downlink; E-8 Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System; Compass Call; EA-6B Prowler; and a variety of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). NTC is capable of replicating all of these enablers in a virtual or constructive environment, but it tries to obtain live assets when possible.

Integrating SOF into NTC rotations is a major objective of training units. Last year, the NTC sponsored training rotations by one Army Special Forces battalion and two Navy SEAL teams. Both Army and Navy SOF have training events planned at the NTC in the coming year.

**Air-ground integration.** The NTC has implemented the latest air-ground integration TTPs from theater and has also developed state-of-the-art A2C2 facilities to replicate airspace-management problem sets from theater.

The NTC's airspace C2 play is modeled after procedures used in Baghdad and other parts of Iraq. The Center has developed zones for airspace below the coordinating altitude, so that units can integrate assets such as UAVs, rotary-wing aircraft, and fires. Above the coordinating altitude, NTC uses the kill-box keypad system and replicates elements of a combined air operations center with help from the



A Marine battalion benefits from the NTC's joint orientation. Units must routinely integrate other-service capabilities, to include Army SOF and Navy Seals.





DOD

**The NTC is on the cutting edge of escalation-of-force training. Realistic scenarios force Soldiers to consider non-kinetic solutions to problem sets before resorting to force.**

Air Warrior Program from nearby Nellis Air Force Base in Nevada. During one recent rotation, a unit successfully integrated 13 different air platforms simultaneously in support of ground operations. Training units routinely integrate air assets in a variety of key missions: IED defeat, UAV teaming, counter-mortar/rocket operations, route reconnaissance, convoy security, cordon and search, raids, and PR operations.

Based on unit feedback, the NTC constructed improved aviation facilities in a new aviation forward operating base designed to replicate facilities used in Iraq and Afghanistan. To reduce wear and tear on helicopters, the facility has a paved runway with 29 concrete landing pads. The aviation forward operating base also includes two maintenance hangars and other buildings in which to conduct aviation operations and maintenance.

**Escalation-of-force training.** Recent feedback from the theater indicates a need for increased

training on the proper application of firepower, in particular the application of minimal firepower to defeat a threat and protect the force. The NTC has developed a two-phased approach, emphasizing in both the uniquely designed lane training and embedded dilemmas within the mission-rehearsal exercise. Units are trained on the latest theater-generated escalation-of-force procedures, and throughout the rotation leaders receive constant feedback on unit performance. The NTC environment also allows us to show the consequences of excessive use of force through realistic play featuring Arab media, local Iraqi reaction, and human rights organizations.

## The Way Ahead

Our experience in training units for the GWOT confirms one thing: The only constant in this business is the constant need for change. Given this reality, the NTC team is working on the following new initiatives:

- **Improved urban operations facilities.** The NTC requires larger, more complex urban operations facilities in order to challenge units with realistic training in an urban environment. For Fiscal Year 2006, the Army has committed over \$12 million to begin construction of a 300-building urban operations facility. Follow-on funding of \$45 million to complete the project and provide state-of-the-art instrumentation is included in future defense plans.

- **Interagency and NGO training.** Feedback indicates we could do a better job training units to face the complexity of the NGO and interagency environment. The NTC currently employs over 20 role players who simulate these functions. Training units receive some benefits from NGO-agency interplay, but we aren't fully maximizing a great training opportunity. The Army's investment in the realism of the NTC environment could easily be leveraged by other governmental and nongovernmental organizations, which could receive training even as they help train Soldiers. In a war in which all the elements of national power are at play, we would welcome the opportunity to make the NTC truly the "National" Training Center.

**Training with Iraqi Security Forces (ISF).** One of the NTC's top priorities is to find ways to better prepare training units to work with and train ISF. The NTC currently uses Iraqi-Americans to play Iraqi police and members of an Iraqi army battalion



DOD

Soldiers working with Iraqi-American role players at the NTC transport a “wounded” comrade to safety.

(with U.S. augmentee units filling out the Iraqi battalion), but the training is not completely realistic and does not portray many of the complexities of dealing with Iraqi units in theater. We are exploring options to bring greater realism to this training and to build relationships with real Iraqi units earlier in the training strategy.

**Exportable training capability.** Restationing overseas units in the United States and the requirements of the Army Force Generation model will create a need for more CTC-like experiences. While increased rotations at the Joint Readiness Training Center and the NTC are planned, the full number of new requirements cannot be accommodated at existing training centers. This shortfall, coupled with the divisions’ diminishing ability to support home-station training (a result of modularity), will create a greater requirement for CTCs to assist with home-station training. The NTC has already conducted prototype Exportable Training Capability packages at Fort Carson, Colorado, and Fort Bragg, North Carolina, during the last 18 months. Whether using mobile training teams for specific training requirements or doing full-up mission-rehearsal exercises,

our experience indicates this is a viable option for improving the quality of home-station training (given the availability of adequate resources for O/Cs, instrumentation, OPFOR, and role players).

## Leading the Army Forward

Today, the NTC as well as its sister CTCs are at the forefront of leading the Army through a second revolution in training—a process of continual change. Instead of training units to improve their readiness for possible deployment for worldwide contingencies, we are focused on creating a full-spectrum operational environment and learning experience that will prepare them for the harsh realities of imminent combat in Iraq or Afghanistan. In many ways, this might be the most important work the NTC has ever done. The leading advocates of this change are unit commanders faced with the realities of preparing their units for war. The leading agents of change are a new generation of O/Cs and OPFOR who, with recent combat experience and an irresistible will to ensure victory and save lives, are helping train their brothers-in-arms for the changing requirements of war. **MR**